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THE LAW OF PROCEDURE FROM A SOCIAL
POINT OF VIEW
H. MUNCH-PETERSON, LL. D.*
Procedure is a public institution. Possibly this sounds like an
obvious truism-a mere statement of fact,--and perhaps this is all it
is. But at the same time there is reason to emphasize the truth of
this fact, in the face of the many mistaken beliefs upon this very
point, which have so long prevailed.
In considering legal procedure from the standard of old Roman
law-which looked at the right to plead (actio) as merely one section of substantive law-some jurists are misled by the nature of
the dispute in a civil case, and take it for granted that, as the parties
concerned are usually at perfect liberty to settle this dispute themselves, the same liberty will naturally be accorded them in the resultant lawsuit.
The proof of the fallacy of this supposition is due mainly to the
modern German science of procedure and in particular to the efforts
of 0. B4low, who urges the view that when legal proceedings are
instituted, an entirely new situation arises, quite independent of
the material circumstances forming the basis of the case. In the
subsequent procedure the judge-as the representative of Societyis an essential factor, and thus the case to be tried assumes at once a
public character, however much it may in fact deal with legally
private matters.
From a theoretical point of view this new assumption is of immense importance. At one stroke it does away entirely with the
notion of a blind transfer of the rules of private arbitration to
legal procedure. In numberless civil cases, the autonomy of the
parties is recognized, but this right is allowed only out of a regard
for general commerce and would not be applicable in legal procedure. Indeed if liberty of settlement were recognized here also, it
might easily upset the whole legal machinery of the state and thus
render her aims and objects quite illusory.
*Professor at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. This article is being
published simultaneously in the Minnesota Law Review, under an arrangement between the Minnesota and the North Carolina Law Reviews. It was
delivered, in substance, as a lecture before the Law Schools at the University
of Minnesota and the University of North Carolina,
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Here we find the practical importance of the modern assumption: that a law case is not merely a private but essentially a public
matter. Hence it follows that its whole structure must be decided
not by the private whims of the parties concerned, but by the Public
itself, in conformity with the practical end it serves and with the
social function it fulfils.
As to the further character of these social purposes there cannot
well be any doubt. It can only be: as easily and surely as possible
to assist members of Society to their rights. Everything that serves
this purpose must. be recognised, and on the contrary everything
which is opposed to it must be banned. For instance, if the parties
have the liberty voluntarily to postpone a case experience shows that
this only tends to produce endless and often needless delay, and
consequently this liberty instead of assisting towards speedy settlement which is the aim of legal procedure, acts merely as a
drag, and must therefore be curtailed. Similarly if the liberty of
debtors to waive legal proceedings tends too greatly to prevent
citizens from obtaining legal satisfaction in a court of law this right
must be limited as much as is necessary to circumvent this danger.
In considering the whole question of procedure it must not be
forgotten that its object is not in itself, but that it serves another
and higher end-the consummation of perfect justice. The more
we emphasize the contrast between procedure and substantive law,
the more important it becomes to remember that there is however
this profound organic connection between them,---that procedure
is and can never be anything more than the servant of justice, whose
value and importance will depend solely upon how satisfactorily
procedure can fulfil her duties in this humble role. When we reflect
however that the object of law itself-as the famous German jurist
Rudolf von Ihering once said-is to safeguard the interests of humanity, this role becomes by no means an insignificant one.
In order that this role be properly fulfilled it is not enough that
the rights retained by litigants should not disturb the normal functions of procedure. It is also positively necessary that each individual link in the procedure adopted by the Courts be so arranged
that it becomes as perfect an instrument as possible for the true
consummation of justice, individually as well as socially.
If we would briefly express what, from this point of view, might
be called the epitome of procedure in our time it is, in a word,
.simplification. All superfluous technical precepts (and in truth most
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of them are superfluous) must be eliminated. The weak economic
position in which most European countries find themselves after
the War necessitates the greatest possible economy in every wayand legal procedure must likewise be subjected to the strictest supervision. But the kind of procedural retrenchment to which I refer
would, if carried out, not only be for its own good but for society's
benefit. Many formalities are truly not merely unnecessary but are
often quite harmful in preparing pitfalls in the way of the establishment of true justice. Most of the written records which still
encumber many legal cases even though they are called "oral" might
easily be dispensed with. They tend more often to confuse the issue
than to clarify it.
The lamentable result of the many intricate unnecessary procedural steps, and of the equally superfluous written matter, is that
many cases are prolonged to such an unconscionable time. This
alone, if nothing else, should deal a death blow to any attempt to
justify such procedure. It was perhaps an exaggeration when a
wit once remarked that "it was much more important that a trial
be quick than that it be just," but it is certainly true that in many
cases it may be equally important that it be quick as well as just.
If a man goes to Law for the recovery of an animal, there is
not much satisfaction in winning the case if the action is settled only
long after the animal is dead. Or if a man is injured in a motor
accident, his right to damages will be of little more than theoretical
importance if he has to wait years before being awarded them. In
the bustling business life of our times enormous damage may be
done-both to individuals concerned and, economically to the nation-by sluggish procedure. Litigation may often mean the tying
up of large sums-assets which the litigating firms are unable to
touch. They do not know whether they are entitled to them or not,
and cannot count on them in their business transactions. The burden of the many economic difficulties with which business menor at any rate European business men-have to struggle after the
War cannot but be increased by delays of this sort.
The artificiality and slowness of legal proceedings, as experience
shows, simply invites misuse. Debtors, for example, are able to obtain a moratorium from fulfilling their engagements, which they
do not deserve.
The new Danish procedure is based on these points of view.
In Denmark the whole disposal of a case from beginning to end
generally does not take more than one or two months.
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The spoken word, on the other hand, is an extremely useful ally
in accelerating the speed of procedure, and, with its twin sister,
"immediacy" which possesses the added advantage that all evidence
is given straight to the judges who are to decide the case-it serves
to convey to the court a true and unbiased account of the case, and
all the details necessary to give a decision, which even a most studious
perusal of the written evidence would hardly obtain.
There is also a certain "social political" element, as it is often
called, about this need to simplify and accelerate legal procedure in
that it is only when these reforms have taken place that the Law
will become a fit instrument to protect the interests of our poorer
classes. It is especially difficult for the poor to surmount the artificial barriers fixed by law around all legal proceedings, and that they
are the ones to suffer most in being debarred too long from recovery
of their rights is only too obvious. Take the case of an artisan
who has been robbed of his tools and with no prospect of recovering them for a year or possibly two is therefore prevented from
continuing his work. Here it is certainly evident that slow justice
is equivalent to no justice at all.
This idea of "social justice" first advanced by Anton Menger,
the Austrian, and later so ably carried out by Franz Klein has become the keystone of Austrian civil procedure, and this again, in
many respects, has served as the model of the Danish and Norwegian laws of procedure.
It also exercises some influence upon the judge's position in
civil procedure. In principle, a judge-in conformity with what
in Germany is called: "Verhandlungsmaxime"" which Professor
Millar of Northwestern University in his highly interesting pamphlet translates the "principle of party-presentation," contrasted with
the "principle of judicial investigation,"-ought to interfere as little
as possible with the pleading of the case, and should in the main
leave the evidence and its production to the litigants themselves.
Otherwise he might form a biased opinion beforehand and thus be
unable to make the final decision with the necessary acumen and
impartiality. But this view may easily be carried to excess, andas was the case in the written methods of procedure formerly in
use on the European continent-a judge may remain a mere passive
spectator during a trial without the power to lift a finger to help
towards the elucidation of a case.
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This method of procedure does at least presuppose fully capable
litigants, usually assisted by lawyers. If the parties are unable to
afford the expense of such legal assistance themselves, as much as
possible ought to be done to allow them legal aid and free costs.
In the Danish law every person who does not possess the means
to carry on a lawsuit that is esteemed reasonable can be relieved of
paying the court fees; and all other necessary expenses, including the
fee to the counsel, will be paid by public means. In cases where
the amounts thus involved are considered an overstrain on the public purse the judge is instructed to assist and guide the parties. The
more simply and less artificially legal procedure is arranged, the
better and more naturally will he be able to do this.
A certain social political tendency is also evident in the rules
applying in Danish procedure, where it is laid down that a lawyer
is prevented from demanding larger fees than can honestly be considered reasonable remuneration for the legal services he renders,
and in case there has been a definite agreement as to payment, which
is obviously unfair to the litigant in question, the agreement may even
be declared null and void.
Another link in this social political tendency are the "exemption"
statutes, which are continually being amplified-a movement which
seems to be spreading over the whole world. Since the amendment,
in the Act of 1925, it is now strictly forbidden-by Danish Lawto take a lien either on the necessary wearing apparel, linen, bed
and bedclothes of a debtor and his family, or even on "other effects," provided that such effects are necessary to the upkeep of a
simple dwelling for the debtor and his family and are not valued
at more than 150 Danish kroner (about 40 dollars) in the case of
a single person and 500 kroner where the debtor has to support
a family.
Indigent debtors are thus effectively protected, but there is of
course a reverse side, in that it is now becoming increasingly difficult for poor people to obtain any credit.
My remarks up to now have applied mainly to civil procedure.
If we turn to criminal law no one nowadays can be in any doubt as
to its public character and social function. But it seems to me that
we have not always followed the consequences of this view to their
utmost length.
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The aim of criminal procedure-and in the light of modern
ideas the aim also of criminal law itself-is to protect Society from
crime. But the need for protection is not equally urgent in the case
of all offenders. It is the professional or habitual criminal who constitutes the real menace to Society and whom Society must therefore
combat with the most powerful means at its disposal. Occasional
criminals, on the contrary, do not present the same danger and in
their case, Society may well be somewhat more lenient.
If we are briefly to define our modem criminalistic viewpoint as
contrasted with that formerly held under "classical" criminal law,
we might well say that punishment awarded nowadays is a link in
conscious and efficient social hygiene, whilst formerly it was merely
an example of abstract justice. Under what we call "classical" law,
punishment was dealt out blindly, and with neither purpose nor
feeling, without regard to the harm that might be done through
the individual to Society itself. One cannot help thinking of a dog
biting its own tail, as no heed was taken as to whether any real
protection to Society was secured by this means.
But a modern social hygienist-as a criminalist ought to be-reflects more than once before he uses a weapon as doubtful in its
beneficial effects upon society and upon the individual concerned
as he well knows punishment to be. He therefore lays most weight
upon the "prophylactic" method, that is to say he gives especial attention to everything that will serve to check and destroy the reasons for crime itself. But even when an individual has passed
beyond the criminal boundary, a criminalist of the modern school
will ndt despair of him. As long as there is hope he will avoid
punishing him and will try by other means to save him for Society,
When everything else fails, and only as a last resort, will punishment be employed, but then it must be so effective that it affords
Society secure protection from these individuals who in spite of all
that i$ done for them will not be assisted or driven away from their
criminal habits.
However, if it may be said that to avoid punishment as long as
possible is one of the main objects of modern criminalism, it is obvious that this view also must influence the rules of criminal procedure. Even in the case of persons who really have committed
a crime we are averse to using punishment. But how much greater
does not our aversion become-how awful is not the thought-that
punishment may be awarded to an innocent person? The case is
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not much better when we jail a suspected person for an indefinite
period-or employ other equally evil legal expedients. Even though
the prisoner be liberated finally-for want of sufficient evidencein many cases be will suffer the same injury to his social position
as if he had really been guilty and sentenced. Hence our criminalistic efforts must be directed rather towards obtaining the greatest
possible security from sentencing the innocent and from misuse
of legal process.
In weighing the pros and cons of public security on the one
hand, and individual liberty on the other, it is obvious that the rules
to apply in the various cases will depend greatly upon whether an
accused belongs to one or another of the above mentioned criminal
categories.
If it is not a case of an habitual criminal but possibly of a person who is accused for the first time, the legal precaution can hardly be made strong enough. Here in truth the old sentence holds
good: "Rather that ten guilty should go free than one innocent
person should be punished."
The accused should therefore always be assisted by a legal adviser and if he cannot afford the fees himself, counsel should be
appointed and fully paid for by the Crown-otherwise it is not to be
expected that his services would be very effective. And this appointment of counsel for the defence by the Crown is especially
necessary immediately upon the arrest of a suspect, since the very
fact that a person is detained will usually prevent him from seuring
the services of anyone himself. Nothing would be more likely to
cause bad feeling and to incite class hatred than-in cases dealing
often with matters of vital importance-to differentiate between rich
and poor.
Strict regulations should also be enacted with regard to arrest
in the case of persons of hitherto blameless character-and should
an arrest have been ordered in the case of an innocent person wrongly accused, he ought, in the most comprehensive way possible, to
receive full and complete compensation and rehabilitation. Finallyin countries where juries are employed, the accused should be given
full liberty to avail himself of their services, especially in cases of
a more serious nature.
These views have also been fully realized in the new Danish
Procedure Act of 1916, which came into force in 1919. This Act
has been modelled largely upon similar arrangements in foreign
countries, especially England, but the arrangements for counsel have
been borrowed from French Law. What may, however, to a cer-
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tain degree be described as an original departure in our legislation,
is the difference in conformity with the basic criminalistic idea mentioned before which it makes between persons previously punished and first offenders. Those who have been punished for certain criminal offences, will not enjoy the same unlimited right to
demand the assistance of a legal adviser the moment they are arrested, as may persons who -have a clean criminal record. In the
rather many cases where, according to our law, the use of a jury
depends upon the prisoner's own wishes, the previous offenders, when
the former offence was of a serious nature, have no right to demand
trial by jury, nor ordinarily to claim damages or redress for wrong
arrest. In my opinion the Danish legislative regulations in this
respect almost overshoot the mark, but it seems to me that they are
at least based upon an idea that is just and well founded-that in
dealing with the large army of professional criminals it is impossible without running too many risks to employ the same methods
as with ordinary citizens. In dealing with these declared enemies
of Society it is necessary to a certain degree to employ a sort of
martial law, entailing, as does martial law, a curtailment of the ordinary rights of citizenship. Only when we thus recognize the possibility of establishing special laws to apply in exceptional cases,
can we-without being faced by too many counter arguments-be
able to direct all our efforts to drawing up our common criminal
laws in the way most beneficial to free citizenship.
That legal procedure may properly fulfil its social function does
not depend only upon its outward form, but possibly even more
upon the persons to whom the execution of these aims of justice
have been entrusted. It is necessary that these persons be imbued
with a sense of the present day spirit of social justice.
And here at once we find that certain provisions must be made
for the education of thee future jurists. It might be thought that in
order to conform to the spirit of our times this education ought to
be purely practical, the young jurists being simply attached to the
office of some legal practitioner and there learning under his supervision the ins and outs of legal procedure.
Something of this sort was-as you all know-once attempted in
England and also here in America, but the results obtained in this
way were disappointing, to say the least. In the intricate life of
a court or office an inexperienced legal mind can never discover the
real point at issue, and it would be something of a happy accident
if the practitioner where the student was placed had the will or the

PROCEDURE FROM A SOCIAL POINT
ability to teach him what he really needed, for the true pedagogic
ability, taking things as they are, is an extremely rare quality. This
kind of instruction must therefore be left to those who have made a
special study of their subject, for it will usually take up so much
time, that it will be difficult for a practising lawyer to carry out these
duties as a sort of side line in addition to his main occupation. Looking at this matter from the other side, it would certainly be well
if teachers of the science of law would keep in constant touch with
practical legal life, and it is of quite especial importance that their
own education beforehand should not have been entirely and solely
theoretical, but that they should also have had the opportunity
of learning at first hand the practical value of the theory of law
as it is actually used in commercial and social life itself.
Therefore the main object in law studies should not be merely
the practice alone. to learn this thoroughly the majority of jurists,
at the conclusion of their university career, will usually have more
than enough time on their hands, during the many years they have
to spend before they are able to obtain an independent position.
The comparatively limited time which young jurists spend upon
their university studies is too valuable for them to waste any of it
on the same practical work that they will usually have to repeat the
rest of their lives. They ought to direct all their energies towards
obtaining as solid a general foundation for their future work as
they possibly can.
This foundation ought to consist mainly of theoretical knowledge,
and especially a broad training in the field of sociology would be a
decided advantage in arming a young man for his work in the service
of Society which so characterises a lawyer's position today. In my
opinion the study of law must be thoroughly based on the notion
that law is an integral part of social life.
It is not the actual visible amount of reading however, which
is so important. It is my impression, on the contrary, that on the
European continent at any rate, we are inclined to exaggerate our
demands in this direction, although it is of course impossible to
exhaust the endless kaleidoscopic phases of legal life. But what
is required above all is that the knowledge acquired be thoroughly
grasped so that it really becomes part and parcel of oneself. In this
respect attention given to the concrete cases in legal life will be
of great use. That this is so, is fully proved by the records of the
famous American Law Schools, first, I think in Harvard, where by
means of the "Langdell" or "case" method quite exceptionally good
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results have been obtained, also as regards pure theory. Only along
this path will a young jurist obtain the right schooling, and develop
that practical judgment, which is the chief asset of the servants of
Law, for they will as a result be better able to master also the new
intricacies of law which they come across in their subsequent careers.
Though I fully recognise the value of this case method and therefore have been anxious to introduce it in Denmark, I am still in doubt
as to whether it ought to be the only one. There may be domains
of the science of law where more theoretical lectures would give
better results. At least in the Scandinavian countries we use the
case method only as supplementary to our University lectures.
In order that true human justice may be attainable, it will however be of importance that other people besides jurists should assist
at legal proceedings.
In Denmark trials by purely lay members are hardly known, and
the experience gained in a certain field,--that of disputes arising
from the sale of domestic animals, where lay judges are employed,cannot be said to be exactly an encouragement to continue any further in this direction. Possibly they have obtained a certain popularity among the peasants themselves (who are as you know a
powerful factor in Denmark), since they feel a sort of class satisfaction in having their own Courts, but regarded from a higher standpoint of justice the decisions given by these "arbitration courts,"
as they are called, leave much to be desired.
In Denmark no attempts have otherwise been made to oust jurists from their work in administering justice. Their expert knowledge of the common laws of justice which they represent are of
recognised importance. A court consisting solely of lay judges would
be considered in Denmark a retrograde step in legal culture, and the
possibility of using lay judges to more than assist our legal judges
is out of the question.
The question of such assistance by lay judges arises primarily
in criminal procedure. Whether the services of lay judges are to
be secured in the same way as in American and British Courts,-I
refer to juries, who decide independently the question of a prisoner's
guilt,-or as assistant or "'associate" judges (in German called
"Sch6ffen") to settle both the question of guilt and punishment in
co6peration with the legal judges-that is still a question on the
continent. But nearly everyone who has had any opportunity of
seeing these popular courts at work-in Denmark we know them
only in the larger cases-as juries-agrees that they are certainly of
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great advantage to legal procedure. As the basic reason for this it is
in Denmark considered that a jury stands as the personal representative of common human justice in criminal procedure and thus forms
a counter-balancing influence to a purely legal view, which declares
a certain act illegal and punishable without its illegality having any
root in the public conscience, or without the prisoner himself really
having been aware of the fact.
In civil procedure a lay judge's principal importance is considered
that of bringing forward special expert knowledge which the court
is more easily able to understand from him than from any complicated statement made by "expert witnesses." There will thus
also be a better prospect of neutralising a too extensive use of arbitration courts-which are used rather much in Denmark but are
open to so much criticism from a fundamental point of view.
We have in Denmark never used juries in civil cases and would,
I think, consider them a little out of place there. But in maritime and
commercial cases we know and use lay experts as assistant judges,
and at the Maritime and Commercial Court in Copenhagen they have
amply proved their worth.
In conformity with this idea, their institution might also be
extended to various cases of technical nature, for in such cases with
the help of expert assistant lay judges the Court would be supplied
with knowledge which would be of inestimable advantage in arriving at a just decision in each individual case. This arrangement
we also find for instance in the Norwegian Code of Procedure of
1915 which has however not yet come into force.
Indeed co6peration of this kind with practical men in every
walk of life would in many ways-as I know personally from my
work as one of the presidents of the Copenhagen Maritime and
Commercial Court-serve greatly to assist in the enrichment and
development of the jurists themselves.
It may with certainty be asserted that what jurists might lose
in outward power by such co6peration with non-legal assistant
judges, would be easily balanced by what they would gain of inner
strength, and also here we thus find a corroboration of the immense
importance of a close connection between the law and lawyers and
the practical life and its men.

